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Abstract 
A vast literature has emphasized that small banks are at a comparative 
advantage in small business lending. In this paper, we show that apart from 
size, which is negatively correlated with bank specialization in small 
business lending, organizational characteristics affect bank loan portfolio 
choices. By using a unique dataset based on a recent survey of Italian banks, 
we find that after having controlled for bank size, a branch loan officer’s 
authority has a key role in explaining bank specialization in small business 
lending. In particular, banks which delegate more decision-making power to 
their branch loan officers are more willing to lend to small firms than other 
banks. We approximate loan officers’ authority by controlling for several 
factors which shape their incentives: loan officer turnover, the amount of 
money up to which they are allowed to lend autonomously, their role in 
loan approval and in setting loan interest rates, the kind of information (soft 
versus hard information) used for screening and monitoring borrowers, and 
the structure of their compensation schemes. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
A large body of the literature has highlighted how large banks are less prone to lend to small 
firms (e.g. Berger et al., 2005). An interpretation of the reluctance of large banks to lend to small firms 
is that these borrowers are opaque and can only be screened and monitored on the basis of soft 
information (Stein, 2002).  
Soft information has two main characteristics that would make large banks less able to lend to 
opaque borrowers than small intermediaries. Firstly, soft information is gathered by a face-to-face 
interaction between lenders and borrowers which requires physical proximity. In principle, the 
proximity to borrowers may be achieved by both large and small banks by means of their branch 
networks. Banks would only need to delegate the acquisition of soft information to their branch managers. 
However, the second key characteristic of soft information  – i.e. poor verifiability – gives rise to principal-
agent problems when the production of information is delegated. According to Stein (2002), agency 
problems are particularly severe in complex organizations where the information has to be passed on 
through many hierarchical layers. By assuming that the size of the bank and the complexity of its 
organization are closely linked, Stein’s model also predicts that large banks are less able than small 
banks to produce soft information and thus to lend to opaque borrowers.  
The model proposed by Stein (2002) is based on the intuition that the ability of branch managers 
to credibly transfer soft information – i.e. the efficiency of the communication technology – depends on 
the organizational complexity of the bank. Therefore the efficiency of the communication technology is 
crucial for the functioning of the so-called internal capital market, by means of which internal financial 
resources are allocated by bank headquarters among branches. Loan officers collect information, both 
soft and hard, about potential borrowers and then compete for funds on the internal capital market. 
Naturally, bank headquarters can assess the quality of the projects that branch officers want to finance 
only on the base of verifiable information. This implies that, insofar as branch managers are unable to 
harden it, soft information is useless for capital budgeting purposes. Thus, branch manager incentives 
to exert effort in the production of soft information are positively related to their ability to show their 
headquarters that the projects they want to finance are creditworthy. The efficiency of the 
communication technology, by means of which information is passed on from branches to higher 
organizational layers, is then strictly related to the level of the loan officer’s authority, that is the degree 
of control over lending decisions that branch loan managers have.  
                                                 
1 This paper is part of a research project conducted by the Bank of Italy on “Banking organization and local credit markets”. 
We would like to thank for their very helpful suggestions Piero Alessandrini, Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti, Paola Bongini, 
Luigi Cannari, Hans Degryse, Giovanni Ferri, Giorgio Gobbi, Steven Ongena, Paola Rossi, Gregory Udell, Alberto Zazzaro 
and the participants at seminars held at the Bank of Italy, at the Ancona Conference on “The Changing Geography of 
Money, Banking and Finance in a Post-Crisis World”, and at the Conference on “Banche, mercati territoriali e offerta di 
credito”, Bocconi University – Paolo Baffi Centre. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
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Most of the extant empirical literature, investigating bank specialization in small business lending, 
is based on the hypothesis that organizational complexity is directly related to bank size. In particular, 
these contributions2 assume that large banks are more hierarchical (i.e. the head office is less prone to 
delegate) and branch loan officers have less authority compared with small banks’ loan officers. 
However, Albareto et al. (2008), by exploiting a very unique dataset on the organizational characteristics 
of Italian banks recently surveyed by the Bank of Italy, showed that there is some heterogeneity in bank 
organization even within banks of similar size. As a result, even if size is probably an important driver 
affecting bank organizational design, it is not the only influence and it is also important to look at the 
nature of the loan officer’s authority. 
In this paper, we test whether the branch loan officer’s authority affects bank specialization in 
small business lending. Differently from previous contributions, we do not proxy the branch loan 
officer’s authority with the size of the bank. Indeed, we exploit the recent Bank of Italy survey which 
has provided us with detailed information about the number of hierarchical layers involved in small 
business lending approvals, loan officer turnover, the use of credit-scoring techniques, the amount of 
money up to which branch loan officers are entitled to lend, and the type of loan officer compensation 
schemes. Furthermore, the availability of detailed and new information on the organizational structure 
of a very large sample of Italian banks gives us the opportunity to shed light on how the various 
characteristics of bank organization interact among themselves.  
While the relation between the loan officer’s authority and small business lending specialization is 
clearly stated in Stein’s model (2002), it is not an easy task to test that link empirically. Firstly, following 
Aghion and Tirole (1997), one has to be aware that there is a distinction between formal authority (the 
right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions), and econometricians may, at 
best, reasonably observe the formal authority of a loan officer while, if they want to test Stein’s 
predictions, they need to observe the real authority. Secondly, loan authority and effort depend on many 
factors, such as: the maximum amount loan officers are entitled to lend on their own, their discretion in 
setting rates, the kind of loan officer compensation scheme, and so on. On the one hand, these factors 
interact among themselves in shaping the organizational design of the loan approval process within a 
bank; on the other hand, formal organizational features may impinge on the real authority of a loan 
officer in quite a complex way. For these reasons, instead of focusing on a specific organizational 
characteristic, we adopt an holistic approach and we include in the estimation different organizational 
variables which are presumably related to the real authority of the loan officer in order to investigate – 
bank size being equal - how different organizational solutions in modelling local officers incentives can 
affect bank portfolio choices. Thus, we contribute to the literature investigating the role of organization 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive review on banking organizational issues is summarized in Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2007). 
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for bank lending specialization in two main ways. Firstly, by using a unique dataset including 
information about bank organizational features and lending techniques,  we are able to go beyond the 
comparison between large and small banks. Secondly, we show that small business lending 
specialization is positively correlated with many bank organizational characteristics linked to a loan 
officer’s authority; moreover, we support the idea that the link between formal and real authority may 
be quite complex.3 In other terms, by using the survey on bank organization we are able to shed light 
on some features of the organizational “black box”. However, we are aware that this is only the first 
step to understanding the way that box may actually work.  
Another insight of the paper is that we verify how the distance between the borrower and bank 
headquarters (functional distance)4 interacts with the organizational scheme, especially with the loan 
officer’s authority, and then affects bank willingness to lend to opaque borrowers. Following 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) and Hauswald and Marquez (2006), we argue that the ability of a 
branch loan officer to transfer soft information to higher hierarchical layers – which is closely related to 
the loan officer’s authority – depends not only on the organizational complexity of the bank, as put by 
Stein (2002), but also on functional distance.5   
Finally, we exploit geographical and sector heterogeneity across banks to compute our measure of 
specialization in small business lending for each bank at the province/sector level. This allows us to 
disentangle supply (bank organization characteristics) and demand factors (firm characteristics) and to 
control also for some lending relationship features, like the functional distance between bank 
headquarters and borrowers. 
The main results of the analysis are the following. Firstly, our analysis confirms that large banks 
are generally less prone to lend to small firms than other banks. This is in line with previous empirical 
contributions, supporting the view that small banks are better able to lend to opaque borrowers 
compared with larger intermediaries.  
Secondly, we show that bank size is only part of the whole story since, even after having 
controlled for it, bank organizational features help to explain differences across banks in small business 
lending. In particular, our analysis suggests that loan officer authority is positively related to small 
business lending activity. Indeed, we find the more loan officers are involved in loan approval decisions 
and/or in setting loan pricing, the more the bank is specialized in small business lending. 
                                                 
3 Our econometric specification is not able to avoid endogeneity problems and our results cannot therefore be interpreted as 
causal effects.  
4 To the best of our knowledge, Alessandrini et al. (2005 and 2008) were the first to use this definition, in opposition to the 
physical proximity between borrowers and bank branches (the so-colled operational distance).  
5 Mistrulli and Casolaro (2008) provide some evidence concerning functional distance and loan rate setting, supporting the 
view that distance affects the ability of a loan officer to harden soft information. Jimenez, Salas-Fumas and Saurina (2008) 
investigate the relationship between functional distance and the use of collateral. 
 5
Conversely, the amount of money up to which loan officer may lend autonomously is negatively 
correlated with bank specialization in small business finance. This result is due to the fact that the 
amount of money loan officers are entitled to lend does not necessarily entail a greater authority for 
loan officers. Indeed, this result is consistent with the hypothesis that loan officers gain private benefits 
by expanding the overall amount of money they lend (the so-called empire-building hypothesis). 
Consequently, they can more easily expand their lending portfolio when they are entitled to grant a 
larger amount of money per each contract. In this way, they obtain the same overall branch target by 
lending to a smaller number of borrowers. Furthermore, by assuming that bank debt is a good proxy 
for firm size and opaqueness they can save on soft information-gathering efforts. 
We also find that, banks which give greater importance to soft information in lending decisions are 
more willing to lend to small businesses, consistently with the view that small firms are opaque 
borrowers and that their creditworthiness assessment is largely based on proprietary information. Small 
business lending specialization is also negatively affected by loan officers’ turnover. This result suggests 
that loan officers’ efforts to gather soft information are less if they stay at a given branch for a shorter 
time.  
In the same direction, our econometric analysis indicates that the distance between bank 
headquarters and borrowers (functional distance) affects the availability of lending to small businesses: the 
shorter the distance between dealing partners, the higher the bank specialization in small business 
finance. This is consistent with the hypothesis that functional distance lowers the capability of branch 
loan officers to credibly pass on soft information to higher hierarchical layers of the bank, reducing 
their ability to compete for internal resources and, as a consequence, the specialization of banks in 
lending to opaque borrowers too.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the econometric 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4  concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology  
 
2.1 Sources of data 
In 2007 the Bank of Italy surveyed the lending practices in use by Italian banks at the end of 
2006. More than 300 banks participated in the survey, accounting for 83 per cent of the overall Italian 
banking system’s lending to firms. Leasing and factoring companies, branches of foreign banks, and 
consumer credit banks were not included in the survey since these intermediaries are highly specialized 
in specific segments of the credit market. The sample covers almost all Italian banks, except for the 
very smallest ones. The accuracy of the data collected is high. Firstly, preliminary interviews with some 
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bankers allowed the questionnaire to be designed so as to avoid potential misunderstandings; secondly, 
ex-post interviews helped fill missing information and clarify erratic answers. 
Banks participating in the survey were questioned about lending to small enterprises: the 
number of hierarchical layers involved in the decision to grant a loan, the kind of information required 
in order to make a lending decision (soft versus hard information), and information about branch loan 
officers, such as the amount of money up to which they are allowed to lend autonomously, the speed 
of their turnover, and their compensation schemes (see Albareto et al., 2008).6  
Initial evidence for bank organization suggests that loan officer power delegation and turnover 
generally increase with bank size (Table 1), but a certain variability in these organizational features 
persists within homogenous groups of banks sharing a similar governance scheme. Furthermore, the 
adoption of different lending techniques (e.g. soft information or rating systems) also shows mixed 
solutions across groups of banks (Table 2). 
We then match the information obtained from the survey with bank Supervisory Reports 
allowing us to compute a measure of specialization in lending to small businesses at both sector (23 
sectors) and geographical level (103 provinces) for each bank participating in the survey. We also use 
bank balance sheet data to compute control variables to take into account bank-level characteristics 
affecting portfolio composition. After a cleaning procedure to detect outliers, 239 banks remain. 
Since the main obstacle of the econometric exercise is to proxy the local officer’s real authority, 
because this is not directly observable, we adopt a pragmatic approach. In particular, it is reasonable to 
assume that both loan officers’ decisional power and their efforts depend crucially on organizational 
design (in term of decentralization and control). Thus, we use a set of bank organizational controls to 
capture local officers’ authority. 
 
 
2.2 The research question and the econometric set-up 
 
The main aim of the econometric analysis is to verify whether banks which delegate more real 
authority to their loan officers (that we approximate with various bank organizational features) are 
more oriented to small business lending, as suggested by Stein (2002). 
Our baseline regression is a cross-section of the following type: 
     
 zjiiziiiijz GeographySectorBankDisthingCreditScorationSoftInformonOrganizatifSHSE ,,,,,,   
 
                                                 
6 For a similar survey concerning US banks, see Udell (1989). 
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The dependent variable (SHSE), which ranges between 0 and 1, is the outstanding amount of 
loans, granted by bank i to small businesses (with less than 20 employees) of sector j and headquartered 
in province z, as a share of the overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j 
headquartered in province z, granted by bank i.  
We have computed bank specialization in small business finance separately for each 
province/sector pair to which a bank lends. In this way we are able to disentangle loan demand factors 
– which vary at both sector and geographical level – and supply factors and in particular bank 
organizational characteristics – which vary at the bank level. To avoid eventual bias due to minimal 
amounts of lending, we drop all bank/sector/province observations accounting for less than 0.002 per 
cent of bank-level total loans.7 Since the bank organizational characteristics are observed at the end of 
2006, our measure of bank specialization in small business finance has been computed as the average of 
the four 2007 quarters. In this way we mitigate both endogeneity and seasonality problems. The 
econometric exercise is carried out by an OLS estimation and the results are checked with a tobit 
regression since our dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1. 
We investigate the impact of different factors on bank specialization in small firm finance.  
Firstly, ionOrganizati  is our key set of variables, controlling for bank organization 
characteristics related to a loan officer’s real decision-making power (see Table 3 for more details). In 
particular, we include in the estimation variables focusing on:  
- the scope of the power delegated (i.e. the amount of finance up to which loan officers may 
autonomously lend, their discretion in setting interest rates or asking for collateral); 
- the turnover policy adopted by banks;8   
- whether loan officers play a relevant role in the loan approval process or not; 
- the kind of reward scheme: some bank headquarters may place a greater emphasis on branch 
profitability, while others may be more oriented to pursue a loan volume target or risk mitigation.  
Bank lending specialization could also be affected by the type of lending technologies adopted 
(Berger and Udell, 1995 and 2002).  In order to control for their impact we use two dummy variables. 
On the one hand, iationSoftInform  is a dummy that is equal to 1 if, according to the survey, bank i 
considers soft information as “crucial”, “very important” or “important” in lending decisions. Since this 
kind of information is difficult to verify, if banks require loan officers to base their lending decisions on 
                                                 
7 The value corresponds at the 10th percentile of the bank level total loan distribution. Alternative thresholds do not affect 
our main results.  
8 In some unreported regressions we have divided the level observed of a loan officer’s delegation and turnover for bank i 
by the maximum computed over all the banks lending to small firms headquartered in province z, since we approximate the 
boundaries of local credit markets – the market relevant to small firms – with those of the 103 Italian provinces. In this way, 
following Degryse, Laeven and Ongena (2007) we aim to capture how bank i's organization differs from that of its 
competitors (other bank lending to firms in province z). Our main findings are robust to the employment of these average 
measures of delegation and turnover. 
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qualitative information or on personal knowledge, this implies that loan officers are largely 
autonomous. On the other hand, iingCreditScor  is a dummy that is equal to 1 if a bank has 
introduced a rating system mainly to monitor and control borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
Moreover, we also take into account that the distance between borrowers and bank 
headquarters can affect the ability of loan officers to pass information along the hierarchy, which then 
lowers the ability of loan officers to compete in the internal capital market. To this aim we compute a 
dummy variable (DISTh) that is equal to 1 if the province9 where borrowers are headquartered is the 
same province where the lending bank i has its headquarters. We have adopted a discrete measure for 
functional distance since most of lending relationships are concentrated within the province where both 
the lender and the borrower are located. 
Finally, Banki  is a vector of variables taking into account other bank-level characteristics, such as 
size, risk and cost efficiency, potentially correlated with portfolio composition, while Sectorj  and 
Geographyz  are respectively firm sector and province dummies, controlling for loan demand factors. 
 Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3, which shows further information on the definition 
of variables employed in the econometric analysis. 
 
 
3. Results  
 
3.1 Basic regressions 
  Results are reported in Table 4.  In the first model (model a) we have regressed our measure of 
bank specialization in small business finance over some bank and firm characteristics. In particular, 
after having controlled for loan demand factors, i.e. for the sector of activity and the province where 
the firm is headquartered (sector and province dummies), we find evidence supporting the view that 
bank size (Size) affects lending portfolio choices. In line with many other papers (e.g. Berger et al., 
2005), our results show that large banks are less prone than small banks to lend to small firms. In  
particular, moving from the 25th percentile of the bank size distribution to the 75th percentile, the share 
of lending to small firms decreases by about 9 percentage points. In the first model, we also control for 
the number of branches a bank has in the province where the borrowers are headquartered (Branches). 
We find that, other things being equal, banks are more prone to lend to opaque borrowers in local 
markets where their network of branches is larger. Our interpretation is that, since lending to small 
firms is mostly based on soft information and this information may be gathered only at a local level, a 
                                                 
9 Italy is divided into 103 provinces, 20 regions and 5 areas (North-West, North-East, Centre, South, Islands).  
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large branch network helps banks to collect soft information, thus making easier to screen and monitor 
opaque firms.   
We also control for the functional distance between the borrower’s and the lender’s 
headquarters. In particular, Disth is a dummy which equals 1 if the firm is headquartered in the same 
province where the bank has its headquarters, 0 otherwise. We find that bank specialization in small 
business lending is higher when the lender and the borrower are functionally close. 
The following equations add controls for loan officer authority. The main aim is to verify 
whether or not bank size fully captures all relevant organizational characteristics of banks affecting loan 
officer authority and then banks’ lending choices. Briefly, we investigate whether, for any given bank 
size, additional controls for loan officer authority have some explanatory power for bank specialization 
in small business lending. If this is the case, that would imply that there is some heterogeneity in terms 
of organizational structure among banks of the same size and that bank size does not capture all the 
significant characteristics of bank organization.  
First of all we control for the scope of loan officer delegation (model b). In particular, 
delegation_approval  is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if  banks participating in the survey reported 
that the role of branch officers in loan approval is “important”,10 and 0 otherwise. We find that 
compared with banks which delegate less power to their loan officers, banks reporting that loan officer 
power is “large” are more prone to lend to small businesses; in particular, their share is 2.9 percentage 
points greater. We consider this variable as crucial to capture the scope of the power delegated to loan 
officers that, within reason, goes beyond the strict approval decision. Indeed, it is reasonable to think 
about loan approval delegation as a pre-requisite for delegating the decision about specific loan contract 
covenants. For example some banks may place more emphasis than others on the discretion loan 
officers may have to set loan interest rates, while others may stress more the quantity of money loan 
officers are entitled to lend on their own initiative. Model c) then adds a measure of loan officers’ 
discretion in setting interest rates. The dummy delegation_price equals 1 if price discretion is 
“important”,11 0 otherwise. We then interact this variable with delegation_approval. Results suggest that, 
conditional on having being delegated the power to approve loans, branch officers’ incentives in 
gathering soft information and then in lending to small business are even greater when they have some 
discretion to set interest rates. In particular, the share of small business lending is on average 4.2 per 
cent greater for banks which delegate significant decision-making power to loan officers both in 
approving loan requests and setting interest rates. 
Another component of loan officer authority might be the amount of finance up to which 
he/she is entitled to lend on his/her own initiative to each borrower.  We then plug into the equation 
                                                 
10 See Table 3 for many details on variable definition. 
11 See previous footnote. 
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(model d) another control variable which is defined as the logarithm of the maximum amount of money 
loan officers are entitled to lend to any single borrower (delegation_loan). We get a negative sign for the 
coefficient of delegation_loan, which means that the specialization of banks in small business lending is 
decreasing in terms of the amount of money loan officers are entitled to lend on their initiative. To 
interpret this result one has to take into account three aspects of lending. First, there is a strict positive 
correlation between firm size and the size of the loan. Second, firm opaqueness correlates positively 
with the firm size. Third, the effort loan officers have to exert in order to screen and monitor firms is 
positively correlated with firm opaqueness. Thus, when loan officers are able to choose among a wider 
set of loan contracts – because their headquarters have defined a higher threshold for the amount loan 
officers may lend on their own initiative – they tend to finance a set of larger firms which therefore 
allows them to lend the same amount of money overall while exerting less effort in screening and 
monitoring borrowers compared with the case in which they lend to a set of smaller firms.12  The 
negative coefficient for delegation_loan indicates that loan officers tend to switch to less opaque 
borrowers when the amount they can lend to each of them increases.  
 
 
3.2 Loan officer tenure and lending technologies 
 
In this section, we test whether banks’ specialization in small business lending depends on loan 
officer turnover and the lending technologies adopted. We argue that both sets of variables may affect 
loan officer incentives: the tenure of loan officers at a given branch may affect their ability to benefit 
from efforts to gather soft information, which requires a prolonged interaction with borrowers. 
Lending technologies may differ in the use of soft or hard information. When a bank puts more 
emphasis on hard information (e.g. by adopting credit scoring techniques), this may entail a reduction 
in the capability of loan officers to have control over lending decisions (i.e. loan officer’s real authority) 
thus deterring soft information acquisition. 
Model a) in Table 5 includes a control for the time spent by loan officers at a branch (Loan 
Officer Tenure). The coefficient for this regressor is positive and statistically different from zero, 
showing that banks which are more prone to lend to small firms allow a longer interaction of loan 
officers with the local credit market.13 This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the investment 
in soft information requires a longer time to yield some return. As a consequence, loan officers have 
greater incentives to invest in soft information if their stay at the same branch is expected to be longer, 
otherwise their efforts will mostly benefit incoming loan officers.  
                                                 
12 Note that, even if the variable delegation_loan refers to SMEs, there is a positive and strong correlation between the 
maximum amount of money loan officers may lend to SMEs and the amount they may lend to larger firms.  
13 Scott (2006) found similar results for U.S. Banks. Ferri (1997) investigated a similar issue for Italian banks. 
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Another aspect which may affect loan officer authority is the kind of information considered 
more important within the bank. Equation b) includes a dummy variable (Soft Information), which is 
equal to 1 if banks make greater use of soft information than hard information and 0 otherwise. We find that 
the coefficient for the prevalence of soft information is positive and significant too (the relevance of soft 
information increases the share of small business lending by more than 1 per cent), reinforcing the 
interpretation that small business lending requires relationship lending technology. Similarly, by adding 
a control for the use of credit scoring techniques (credit scoring), we get a negative coefficient (the impact 
on small business lending ranges between 1 and 3 per cent) for this variable (model c), indicating that 
the use of hard information is negatively related to the specialization of banks in small business lending. 
Finally, model d) includes only one measure of loan officer power delegation (delegation) while it 
keeps the control for loan officer tenure and the use of soft information. This more parsimonious 
specification is used in the rest of the paper as a benchmark (baseline) equation. 
 
3.3 Loan officer compensation schemes 
 
In this section we take into account the characteristics of the loan officer compensation 
schemes (Table 6). In particular, we add some variables which are related to the variable component of 
loan officer pay-off. Since in general loan officers get a bonus on the base of short-run portfolio 
performance, one has to keep in mind when interpreting the relative coefficients that these variables are 
short-run constraints. First, we plug a dummy variable (loan portfolio size) that equals 1 if the size of the 
loan portfolio held by loan officers is a stringent constraint, and 0 otherwise. In other words, we 
compare banks which put great emphasis on lending portfolio size targets (loan portfolio size =1) with 
other banks which do not. Model a) shows that if loan portfolio size is a stringent constraint then loan 
officers are more prone to lend to small firms. For those banks, the share of business lending is 1.3 per 
cent greater. This result is consistent with the view that when loan officers are rewarded for the 
expansion of a loan portfolio per se, they are less worried about lending to opaque borrowers whose ex-
post profitability may depend on information which has been observed by them but that could not be 
transferred in a credible way to headquarters.  
Model b) includes another control for the loan officer compensation scheme. In particular, the 
dummy loan portfolio profitability equals 1 if the profitability of the overall loan portfolio held by the 
branch manager is a stringent constraint, 0 otherwise. We find that the coefficient for profitability 
targets is negative (the impact on small business specialization is more than 3 per cent) indicating that 
lending to opaque firms requires an investment in soft information which yields some return in the 
medium-long run.  
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By interacting loan portfolio profitability and loan portfolio size (model c) we may also check whether 
the effect of loan portfolio profitability differs among banks which put a higher emphasis on the size of 
loan portfolio than other banks. The coefficient for this interaction term (model c) is positive, signalling 
that the effect of profitability constraints is smoothed by the quantity constraint. In other terms, the 
profitability constraint is less stringent when banks also emphasize quantity targets. Loan officers are 
therefore less concerned with generating returns in the short-run since they are also rewarded better if 
they expand their lending overall. 
 
3.4 Robustness checks 
 
In order to check the robustness of our main findings, we run some alternative econometric 
exercises on our baseline specification (Table 5, model d).  
First, since our measure of bank specialization in small business lending is computed as a share 
(defined between 0 and 1), it can be considered as censored variable. Under this assumption, it would 
be more feasible to estimate our parameters using a tobit methodology. Secondly, we verify how our 
results are robust to a more severe measure of bank specialization in small business lending (e.g. firms 
with less than 5 employees). Table 7 (respectively, models a and b) shows that our baseline results are 
mostly confirmed and that findings are not affected by a different definition of our dependent variable 
or by different estimation techniques. In particular, the more important the role of the loan officer in 
loan approval process, the higher the bank specialization in small business finance. Moreover, banks 
which put much emphasis on the use of soft information in lending to opaque borrowers or which 
invest in loan officer tenure show a higher orientation towards small business finance.14 
Even within banks of comparable size we observe wide heterogeneity in terms of organizational 
characteristics. Looking at Tables 1 and 2, it is possible to note some meaningful differences in 
organization and lending techniques between large and small banks, especially for banks not belonging 
to groups. In particular, large banks exhibit on average higher loan officer turnover and delegation in 
lending to small firms; furthermore, large intermediaries usually assign less importance to soft 
information and make greater use of credit scoring systems in loan approvals. We then investigate 
whether our results are driven by some non-linear effect related to bank size. In order to confirm that 
our results, once we have controlled for size, are capturing this “within group” heterogeneity, we run 
our baseline regression only for the sub-sample of small banks. Table 7 (model c) shows that our results 
                                                 
14 It is important to point out that when we consider bank orientation towards very small firms (those with less than 5 
employees), the distance between lenders and borrowers negatively correlates with a bank’s specialization in lending to this 
kind of firm. At the same time, organizational variables related to loan officers’ authority seem to be less important in 
supporting small business lending. This may be due to the fact that these firms are so opaque that it is so hard for loan 
officers to channel information through the bank’s higher hierarchical levels. As a consequence, organizational solutions 
may be of little help to induce loan officers’ efforts to gather soft information. 
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are robust also in a more homogenous group of banks by size; this evidence allows us to be confident 
that our main results are not just driven by a non linear-size effect.       
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate whether bank organization characteristics affect bank specialization 
in lending to small firms. By using a unique dataset based on a survey of Italian banks, we are able to go 
beyond the traditional large versus small banks comparison. We also exploit detailed data on lending 
activity at province level to investigate how the “functional distance” between bank headquarters and 
borrowers affects bank specialization.  
Our main findings are the following. In line with previous results, we support the idea that bank 
size negatively affects bank specialization in small firm finance due to small banks’ comparative 
advantage in investing in soft information gathering and assessing opaque borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
Moreover, we argue that, apart from size, a bank’s organizational features (loan officer-specific ones) 
play an important role in explaining its orientation to small business lending. In particular, we show that 
the higher the real involvement of the branch officer in the loan approval process, as well as in setting 
interest rates, the higher the bank specialization in financing small and opaque firms. In the same 
direction, we find that the longer the local officer stays at the same branch, the more banks are focused 
on small business finance; experience gained over time can improve a loan officer’s ability to establish 
long-lasting and informative relationships with opaque borrowers. We also find that the amount of 
money up to which loan officer may lend autonomously is negatively correlated with bank 
specialization in small business finance. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that loan officers 
gain private benefits by expanding the overall amount of money they lend (the so-called empire 
building hypothesis). In this way, they obtain the same overall branch target by lending to a smaller 
number of borrowers, thus saving soft information gathering effort.   
Bank specialization in small business lending depends crucially on lending technologies, too. 
Banks more involved in soft information gathering exhibit a greater share of credit granted to small firms, 
while the improvement of internal rating systems (mainly to monitor borrowers’ creditworthiness) 
negatively affects small business lending orientation, giving a prominent role to hard information.  
Finally, we show that banks are less prone to finance small firms in those provinces that are far 
from their headquarters. This is in line with Hauswald and Marquez’s study (2006) and Mistrulli and 
Casolaro’s (2008) findings, showing that functional distance is a proxy for lender-borrower asymmetric 
information problems. 
All in all, our results suggest that, consistently with Stein’s model (2002), an increase in a loan 
officer’s authority is positively correlated with bank specialization in small business lending. However, 
in line with Aghion and Tirole (1997), we are aware of the distinction between loan officer’s formal 
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authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions). Indeed, we control 
for a rich set of formal rules (loan officer’s tenure, the power delegated to loan officers, both in terms 
of the size of the loan and the interest rate charged, the structure of loan officers’ compensation 
scheme, etc.) that all contribute to shape a loan officer’s real authority.  
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Table 1 – Bank size, delegation and loan officer (“LO”) turnover (1) 
(thousand of euros and months) 
 Maximum amount of money LOs are 
allowed to lend autonomously Months LO stays in a branch 
  mean p25 p50 p75 mean p25 p50 p75 
                 
Large and medium-sized banks 458  108  200  380  32  26  32  36  
Small banks in banking groups 211  80  125  250  40  30  36  48  
Stand-alone small banks 112  44  90  150  48  36  40  60  
Cooperative banks 114  10  30  100  49  36  48  60  
         
Total 176  18  71  150  45  33  38  60  
                  
(1) According to the size classification provided by the Bank of Italy, small banks have total assets of less than 7 billion 
euros. 
 
Table 2 – Bank size, loan pricing and lending technology (1) 
(units) 
 
Loan officers allowed to 
lower interest rate by 
more than 25 b.p. 
Importance of soft 
information (2) 
Credit scoring crucial 
in lending decision (3)
  YES NO YES NO YES NO 
             
Large and medium-sized banks 2  12  20  17  30  6  
Small banks in banking groups 3  38  38  36  32  19  
Stand-alone small banks 0  14  10  10  8  9  
Cooperative banks 12  91  108  76  45  41  
       
Total 17  155  176  139  115  75  
              
(1) According to the size classification of the Bank of Italy, small banks have total assets of less than 7 billion euros. – (2) 
This classification is based on a dummy variable that is equal to 1 (YES) for those banks that ranked face-to-face 
relationships with the entrepreneur or the usage of non-traceable information as “crucial” or “very important”. – (3) In this 
case YES is used for banks using credit scoring and/or internal rating systems for SME finance, whose score index is 
crucial for the assessment of credit. 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics on the estimation sample 
Variables Description Mean Median Std. Dev. Expected 
sign 
Dependent variable      
Specialization in small 
business lending  
Share of credit granted by each bank i to sole-proprietorships and other non-financial enterprises 
with less than 20 employees operating in province z (103 provinces) and sector j (23 economic 
activities).  
0.34 0.18 0.37  
Bank characteristics     
Size Log of total assets. 22.89 23.03 1.74 - 
Risk Bad loans on total loans (percentage). 3.31 2.64 2.57 - 
Cost-to-income ratio Operational costs divided by gross income (percentage). 61.42 60.17 11.41 +/- 
Branches  Number of branches of each bank i  in each province z. 8.32 2.00 20.05 + 
      
Bank organization      
Soft information The dummy is equal to 1 if bank i ranked face-to-face relationships with the entrepreneur or the 
usage of non-traceable information in the first three places (“crucial”, “very important” or 
“important”). 
0.53 1 0.50 + 
Delegation_approval  The dummy is equal to 1 if the LO has a “crucial” or “very important” role in loan approvals. 0.89 1 0.31 + 
Delegation_price The dummy is equal to 1 if the LO has a “crucial” or “very important” interest rate discretion. 0.60 1 0.49 + 
Delegation_loan This index is the log value of the maximum loan that a local officer can autonomously grant to 
SMEs.  
5.19 5.11 1.47 +/- 
Loan Officer’s length of 
tenure 
The index is calculated as the logarithm of months the LO of bank i stays in the same branch. 3.53 3.58 0.37 + 
Credit Scoring The dummy is equal to 1 if for a given bank the internal rating system is “crucial” or “very 
important” in monitoring SMEs’ creditworthiness. 
0.56 1 0.50 - 
Loan portfolio profitability The dummy is equal to 1 if the LO’s pay-off is related in a significant way (“crucial” or “very 
important”) to the loan portfolio profitability. 
0.74 1 0.44 - 
Loan portfolio size The dummy is equal to 1 if the LO’s pay-off is related in a significant way (“crucial” or “very 
important”) to the size of the loan portfolio (volume targets). 
0.87 1 0.34 + 
Functional distance      
Disth This dummy is equal to 1 if SMEs are headquartered in the same province where bank i has its 
headquarters.  
0.08 0 0.28 + 
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Table 4 
Loan Officer authority and small business lending: basic regressions 
The dependent variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the outstanding amount of loans granted by bank i to 
small businesses (firms with less than 20 employees) of sector j and headquartered in province z, as a ratio of 
the overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j headquartered in province z, and granted by 
bank i.  Sector and province dummies are always included. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model a Model b Model c Model d 
   Bank Characteristics     
Size -0.0326*** -0.0325*** -0.0320*** -0.0214*** 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0011] 
     
Risk -0.0037*** -0.0038*** -0.0032*** -0.0026*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
     
Cost-to-income ratio 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 0.0017*** 0.0014*** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
     
Branches 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
     
Lender-borrower distance     
Disth 0.0088* 0.0119** 0.0135*** 0.0109** 
 [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0049] 
     
Loan Officer authority     
Delegation_approval  0.0296*** 0.0039 0.0111** 
  [0.0047] [0.0052] [0.0051] 
     
Delegation_approval*Delegation_ price   0.0363*** 0.0317*** 
   [0.0030] [0.0030] 
     
Delegation_loan    -0.0229*** 
    [0.0012] 
     
Constant 0.7440*** 0.7030*** 0.7098*** 0.6034*** 
 [0.0289] [0.0301] [0.0301] [0.0302] 
     
Observations 62,763 62,763 62,763 62,763 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 
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Table 5 
Loan Officer authority and small business lending:  
Loan Officer turnover and lending technologies 
The dependent variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the outstanding amount of loans granted by bank i to 
small businesses (firms with less than 20 employees) of sector j and headquartered in province z, as a ratio of 
the overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j headquartered in province z and granted by 
bank i.  Sector and province dummies are always included. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model a Model b Model c Model d 
   Bank characteristics     
Size -0.0193*** -0.0195*** -0.0194*** -0.0261*** 
 [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0010] 
     
Cost-to-income ratio 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0020*** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
     
Risk -0.0029*** -0.0030*** -0.0031*** -0.0044*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
     
Branches 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
     
Lender-borrower distance     
Disth 0.0106** 0.0107** 0.0112** 0.0121** 
 [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0049] 
     
Loan Officer authority     
Delegation_approval 0.0166*** 0.0200*** 0.0184*** 0.0369*** 
 [0.0052] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0048] 
     
Delegation_approval*Delegation_ price 0.0303*** 0.0316*** 0.0312***  
 [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0030]  
     
Delegation_loan -0.0215*** -0.0211*** -0.0192***  
 [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0013]  
     
Loan Officer’s tenure 0.0318*** 0.0308*** 0.0296*** 0.0413*** 
 [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0045] 
     
 Lending technologies     
Soft information  0.0153*** 0.0131*** 0.0100*** 
  [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] 
     
Credit scoring   -0.0135*** -0.0325***
   [0.0032] [0.0030] 
     
Constant 0.4294*** 0.4211*** 0.4229*** 0.4209*** 
 [0.0384] [0.0384] [0.0384] [0.0385] 
     
Observations 62,763 62,763 62,763 62,763 
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
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Table 6 
Loan Officer authority and small business lending:  
Loan Officer compensation schemes 
The dependent variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the outstanding amount of loans granted by bank i to 
small businesses (firms with less than 20 employees) of sector j and headquartered in province z, as a ratio of 
the overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j headquartered in province z, and granted by 
bank i.  Sector and province dummies are always included. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 Model a Model b Model c 
   Bank characteristics    
Size -0.0200*** -0.0200*** -0.0196*** 
 [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0013] 
    
Cost-to-income ratio 0.0023*** 0.0000 0.0002 
 [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
    
Risk -0.0057*** -0.0022** -0.0036*** 
 [0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0011] 
    
Branches 0.0011*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Lender-borrower distance    
Disth 0.0055 0.0174*** 0.0170*** 
 [0.0057] [0.0063] [0.0063] 
    
Loan Officer authority    
Delegation_approval 0.0634*** 0.0373*** 0.0374*** 
 [0.0062] [0.0070] [0.0070] 
    
 Loan Officer’s compensation schemes    
Loan portfolio size 0.0132*** 0.0382*** 0.0185** 
 [0.0048] [0.0053] [0.0078] 
    
Loan portfolio profitability  -0.0383*** -0.0690*** 
  [0.0039] [0.0102] 
    
Loan portfolio size* Loan portfolio 
profitability   0.0384*** 
   [0.0117] 
    
Loan Officer’s tenure 0.0440*** 0.0128** 0.0102* 
 [0.0051] [0.0057] [0.0058] 
    
 Lending technologies    
Soft information 0.0078** 0.0236*** 0.0257*** 
 [0.0032] [0.0037] [0.0038] 
    
Credit scoring -0.0307*** -0.0313*** -0.0359*** 
 [0.0034] [0.0038] [0.0041] 
    
Constant 0.4173*** 0.4891*** 0.4987*** 
 [0.0435] [0.0486] [0.0488] 
    
Observations 49,074 39,768 39,768 
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 
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Table 7 
Loan Officer authority and small business lending:  
robustness checks  
In the tobit estimation (model a) the dependent variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the outstanding amount 
of loans granted by bank i to small businesses (firms with less than 20 employees) of sector j and 
headquartered in province z , as a ratio of the overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j 
headquartered in province z, and granted by bank i. In the OLS estimation in model b the dependent 
variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the outstanding amount of loans granted by bank i to very small 
businesses (firms with less than 5 employees) of sector j and headquartered in province z, as a ratio of the 
overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j headquartered in province z, and granted by bank 
i. In the OLS estimation in model c the dependent variable, ranging between 0 and 1, is the outstanding 
amount of loans granted by small bank i to small businesses (firms with less than 20 employees) of sector j 
and headquartered in province z, as a ratio of the overall amount of lending to non-financial firms of sector j 
headquartered in province z, and granted by bank i. Sector and province dummies are always included. 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
 Model a) 
Tobit estimation: 
whole sample   
(marginal effects) 
Model b) 
OLS estimation: 
very small firms 
Model c) 
OLS estimation: 
small banks 
Bank characteristics    
Size -0.0105*** -0.0177*** -0.0395*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0027] 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.0014*** 0.0011*** 0.0008*** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] 
Risk -0.0029*** -0.0019*** -0.0013 
 [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0009] 
Branches 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 0.0004** 
 [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0002] 
Lender-borrower distance    
Disth 0.0187*** -0.0171*** 0.0146** 
 [0.0030] [0.0038] [0.0070] 
Loan Officer authority    
Delegation_approval 0.0203*** 0.0259*** 0.0138** 
 [0.0034] [0.0040] [0.0070] 
Loan Officer’s tenure 0.0269*** 0.0243*** 0.0589*** 
 [0.0027] [0.0037] [0.0061] 
Lending techniques    
Credit scoring -0.0166*** -0.0066*** -0.0107** 
 [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0045] 
Soft information 0.0057*** 0.0040* 0.0345*** 
 [0.0018] [0.0024] [0.0044] 
    
Constant - 0.2493*** 0.7147*** 
 - [0.0308] [0.0761] 
Observations 62,763 62,763 31,193 
 
R2 0.10 0.17 0.16 
 
